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9/11 Commission

♦ REMOVING TERRORIST SANCTUARIES: THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS AND U.S. POLICY. [RL32518]

Francis T. Miko.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS). August 10, 2004.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32518.pdf>

[pdf format, 23 pages]

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report in July 2004. A major recommendation in the report was that the U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and, for each, to employ a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. The rationale given for devoting special attention to denial of sanctuaries was the belief that “a complex international terrorist operation to carry out a catastrophic attack would be difficult to mount without a secure place from which to plan, recruit, train, rehearse, and launch the operation.”

The 9/11 Commission identified six primary regions that serve or could serve as terrorist sanctuaries. These included Western Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region; southern or western Afghanistan; the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the nearby Horn of Africa, including Somalia and extending southwest into Kenya; Southeast Asia, from Thailand to the southern Philippines to Indonesia; West Africa, including Nigeria and

Mali; and European cities with expatriate Muslim communities. In all of these regions, the United States and its allies have mounted campaigns to deny safe havens for terrorists. This report analyzes current U.S. policies aimed at closing down sanctuaries in each of these countries and regions in light of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.

◆ **SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REFORMS PROPOSED BY 9/11 COMMISSION, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, SENATORS FEINSTEIN, GRAHAM AND DASCHLE, AND REPRESENTATIVES HARMAN AND GOSS; AND CURRENT STATUTE. [Memorandum]**

Alfred Cumming.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS). August 11, 2004.

<http://www.house.gov/bradmiller/downloads/911sidebysidefinal.pdf>

[pdf format, 32 pages]

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission have stimulated extensive discussions and proposed legislation concerning various methods of reorganizing the United States intelligence community. Among the Commission's recommendations, for example, is the creation of a new position of National Intelligence Director (NID) to be the president's principal intelligence advisor. Among supporters of the creation of the NID position, there are strong disagreements and competing proposals concerning whether or not the NID would have independent budget authority. Other recommendations cover proposed changes in the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the number and structure of Congressional intelligence oversight committees.

This document is a large table, rather like a scorecard, that compares and contrasts each of the major proposals that are now being discussed: current law; recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; Bush administration proposals; legislation introduced by Representative Harman (H.R. 4104); legislation introduced by Representative Goss (H.R. 4584); legislation introduced by Senators Feinstein (S.190), Graham (S. 1520) and Daschle (S. 6).

◆ **TERRORISM: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND RECENT MAJOR COMMISSIONS AND INQUIRIES. [RL32519]**

Richard F. Grimmett.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS). August 11, 2004.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35800.pdf>

[pdf format, 42 pages]

also: http://www.house.gov/israel/issues/911report_crs_081104.pdf

This report highlights key recommendations set out in the report of the 9/11

Commission organized by the following major thematic areas: (1) Focus of U.S.

International Anti-Terrorism Policy; (2) Institutional Steps to Protect Against and

Prepare for Terrorist Attacks; (3) Intelligence Issues; and (4) Congress and Oversight Issues. A bulleted summary is made, under each of these major thematic headings, of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the Bremer Commission, the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, and the Hart-Rudman Commission.

The report provides background details on the origins and mandates of the Commissions whose recommendations are discussed are set out in Appendix 1, as are links to the pertinent websites where the full texts of the reports of these Commissions may be found.

Abu Ghraib Prison

◆ FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE [DOD] DETENTION OPERATIONS. [SCHLESINGER REPORT]

Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations. August 24, 2004.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf>

[pdf format, 126 pages]

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed an independent panel to investigate the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The panel was chaired by Former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger; other panel members were former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, former Congresswoman Tillie K. Fowler and retired Air Force Gen. Charles A. Horne.

"The events of October through December 2003 on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib prison were acts of brutality and purposeless sadism," the panel members state in this report. The report finds brigade commanders at Abu Ghraib directly responsible for abuses at the prison "because they did not adequately supervise what was going on at Abu Ghraib." The report does not lay all the blame for prisoner abuse on the commanders in the field. Panel members fault a lack of Pentagon leadership for indirectly allowing abuses to occur by not anticipating the extent of the post-war discontent and for failing to provide adequate resources for guarding prisoners.

◆ INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB. AR 15-6: INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE.

Anthony R. Jones and George R. Fay.

United States Department of Defense. United States Army. August 25, 2004.

<http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ar15-6/AR15-6.pdf>

[pdf format, 177 pages]

Major General Fay was appointed to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205 MI BDE) were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility in Iraq in latter half of 2003. Specifically, Fay was to determine whether 205 MI BDE personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and whether MI personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. Later, Lieutenant General Jones was appointed as an additional investigating officer. Their individual reports are combined in this document.

Among the findings in these reports are the following:

- 1) "The abuses at Abu Ghraib primarily fall into two categories: a) intentional violent or sexual abuse and, b) abusive actions taken based on misinterpretations or confusion regarding law or policy."
- 2) "... while senior level officers did not commit the abuse at Abu Ghraib they did bear responsibility for lack of oversight of the facility, failing to respond in a timely manner to the

reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross and for issuing policy memos that failed to provide clear, consistent guidance for execution at the tactical level.”

3) “. . . from 25 July 2003 to 6 February 2004, twenty-seven 205 MI BDE Personnel allegedly requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and/or participated in detainee abuse and/or violated established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations during interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib.

4) “Most, though not all, of the violent or sexual abuses occurred separately from scheduled interrogations and did not focus on persons held for intelligence purposes. No policy, directive or doctrine directly or indirectly caused violent or sexual abuse. In these cases, Soldiers knew they were violating the approved techniques and procedures.”

Africa

◆ DAFUR DEADLINE: A NEW INTERNATIONAL ACTION PLAN. [Africa Report No. 83]

International Crisis Group (ICG). August 23, 2004.

http://www.icg.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/083_darfur_deadline_a_new_international_action_plan.pdf

[pdf format, 34 pages]

ICG argues that the UN Security Council must, by its review deadline of 30 August 2004, endorse a new international action plan—taking tougher measures against the Khartoum government, which has acted in bad faith throughout the crisis, and authorizing the African Union (AU), with stronger international support, to follow up more decisively its efforts to improve the situation on the ground and mediate a political settlement. This report calls for the Security Council to adopt more forceful measures, most importantly to authorize the African Union (AU) to send a strong peacekeeping mission—at least 3,000 troops, preferably many more—to Darfur to protect civilians. To demonstrate its seriousness and help persuade the Government of Sudan to accept this mission, it should also impose an arms embargo on it and targeted sanctions against responsible regime officials and ruling party businesses, as well as establish an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate mass atrocities.

◆ MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN THE CONGO: THE ITURI PROBLEM.

[Africa Report No. 84]

International Crisis Group (ICG). August 26, 2004.

http://www.icg.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/084_maintaining_momentum_in_the_congo_the_ituri_problem.pdf

[pdf format, 32 pages]

According to this report, collapse of the Congo peace process and return to war are real prospects in that country, several millions of whose citizens died in the conflicts of the past decade. A massacre of Congolese refugees just across the border in Burundi has focused most attention on the Kivus but the situation in the Ituri district is closely related and presents many of the same symptoms and challenges. ICG believes that the Security Council needs to give the UN Mission (MONUC) that is common to Ituri and the Kivus a clearer mandate and more resources to go proactively after armed groups, and encourage it to devise a diplomatic and

political strategy that can support the efforts of the fragile Transitional Government in Kinshasa to assert control before it is too late.

Arms Control

♦ PERSPECTIVES ON ARMS CONTROL. [INSS Occasional Paper 55]

Michael O. Wheeler; James M. Smith; Glen M. Segell.

United States Air Force (USAF) Academy. USAF Institute for National Security Studies. July 2004.

<http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/OCP55.pdf> [pdf format, 150 pages]

This document comprises three separate reports. Executive summaries written by the authors are provided for each of the reports.

- 1) The American Approach to Arms Control: What Can We Expect from American Diplomacy for the Next Twenty Years? By Michael O. Wheeler:

“America is widely recognized to be a powerful hegemon today. It is important to understand what the American approach to arms control might be like over the next twenty years. Will it mirror the departures of the current Bush administration, or will it go off on different trajectories? Using the broad definition of arms control that is found in the official US State Department arms control and disarmament glossary, this paper offers a historically informed discussion of how the United States got to the point it is today in arms control and where it may go from here. This is not an attempt at prediction or forecasting so much as a discussion of plausible possibilities and relevant trends. Focusing on weapons of mass destruction, and especially on nuclear weapons, it concludes that arms control is not dead in American diplomacy but is evolving.”

- 2) A Tale of Two Countries: Russia, North Korea, and the Present and Future of Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation in United States Policy. By James M. Smith:

“This paper seeks to explain and analyze what has become a shifting, melding United States policy approach to more traditionally distinct forms of diplomatic-centric arms control and nonproliferation with the addition of military-centric counterproliferation constructs and postures. It briefly develops a process view of ‘arms control’ (as the umbrella under which all efforts to manage military force and arms reside) from its pre-nuclear roots and across its nuclear focus during the Cold War to today. It presents the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or Moscow Treaty 2003) and the United States-Russia relationship as representative of the continuing end game of arms control as it existed during the Cold War, characterizing that context, construct, practice, and dynamics as the traditional case and departure point for today’s US policy. It suggests that arms control is not absent from US policy today, but that it is transitioning into a new phase in the face of a new set of strategic challenges. It posits the North Korea case as representative of a whole new category of proliferation-based strategic challenges and of the emerging policy framework. It then reviews post-Cold War United States policy against that context and projects the threads of continuity and elements of change into the near-term future. Finally, from that process and policy perspective, it suggests an evolving triangular policy construct—incorporating arms control, counterproliferation, and homeland defense imperatives—as a logical lens and perhaps more effective policy approach to address the challenges and promises of the full range of ‘arms control’ efforts today and tomorrow.”

- 3) The EU Approach to Arms Control: Does It Differ from the American Approach? By Glen M. Segell:

“The European approach to nonproliferation does not differ from the American approach. To be sure, the American approach as a hegemonic power at the start of the 21st century resembles the European approach of the Great Powers at the start of the 20th century. There is thus consensus in 2004 on the approach to the two big nonproliferation issues for European states. The first of these revolves around relations between America and European states within NATO over European regional security issues. These include the impact of NATO enlargement on Cold War arms control arrangements, particularly the adaptation of the CFE treaty; the future of the Balkans; and, specific matters in the Baltics such as the Russian Kaliningrad base. The second is commonality surrounding the ongoing arms control process on nuclear weapons and missiles between America and Russia that needs European Union (EU) consensus given EU enlargement. Integral to this is EURATOM holding jurisdiction to own, monitor, and verify nuclear material within the European Union, including the new members from Central and Eastern Europe. For all of these America has a willing partner in EU states to engage in bilateral, small-party multilateral, and large-party multilateral nonproliferation efforts.

Notwithstanding this trans-Atlantic nonproliferation consensus, there are fundamental differences on counterproliferation on a global scale outside of Europe. Intrinsic differences of approach exist on the use of American armed force for counterproliferation, especially on the matter of rogue states and non-state entities. In this America finds itself having to engage in unilateral counterproliferation. This will continue to be the case, especially if America chooses to pursue the doctrine of pre-emptive military force for arms control, namely, the Bush Doctrine. Such differences are reconcilable through multilateral cooperation such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.”

Arms sales

◆ CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1996-2003. [RL32547]

Richard F. Grimmett.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Updated August 26, 2004.

<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32547.pdf>

[pdf format, 94 pages]

This report is prepared annually to provide unclassified quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world.

Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2003 was over \$13.7 billion. This was a substantial decrease over 2002, and the lowest total, in real terms, for the entire period from 1996-2003. In 2003, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was nearly \$17 billion, the lowest total in deliveries values for the entire period from 1996-2003 (in constant 2003 dollars).

Recently, from 2000-2003, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with the United States ranking first and Russia second each of the last four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2000-2003, the United States made \$35.8 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing nations, in constant 2003 dollars, 46.8% of all such agreements. Russia, the second leading supplier during this period, made over \$21 billion

in arms transfer agreements, or 27.5%. In 2003, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with over \$6.2 billion or 45.4% of these agreements. Russia was second with \$3.9 billion or 23.4% of such agreements. In 2003, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at \$6.3 billion, or 37.1% of all such deliveries. The United Kingdom ranked second at \$4 billion or 23.5% of such deliveries. Russia ranked third at \$3.3 billion or 19.4% of such deliveries.

During the 2000-2003 period, China ranked first among developing nations purchasers in the value of arms transfer agreements, concluding \$9.3 billion in such agreements. The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) ranked second at \$8.1 billion. Egypt ranked third at \$6.8 billion. In 2003, Egypt ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding \$1.8 billion in such agreements. China ranked second with \$1.6 billion in such agreements. Malaysia ranked third with \$1.5 billion.

Asia

♦ U.S.-CHINA SECURITY MANAGEMENT: ASSESSING THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP.

Kevin Pollpeter.

RAND. August 16, 2004.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG143.pdf

[pdf format, 129 pages]

Restrictions on military-to-military relations with China imposed in 2001 stirred a debate on the value of those activities and their place in the overall U.S.-China relationship. The current debate in the United States on U.S.-China military relations has centered around four major issues of contention: the potential risk of U.S.-China military relations to U.S. national security, the potential benefits of the U.S.-China military relationship to the United States, the ability of the United States to influence China, and the relative levels of reciprocity and transparency in the relationship.

This report finds that there is value in security cooperation, despite its problems. Pollpeter says that the relationship with China should concentrate on security management rather than on security cooperation. He outlines a three-part program of dialogue, information gathering, and limited cooperation that could result in the mutual benefit of minimizing misperceptions and the chances of conflict.

Middle East

♦ DEVELOPING ADAPTIVE LEADERS: THE CRUCIBLE EXPERIENCE OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

Dr. Leonard Wong

U.S. ARMY WAR College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004, 29 p.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/pubyear.cfm?year=2004>

The author examines the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM environment and concludes that the complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity of postwar Iraq in producing a cohort of innovative,

confident, and adaptable junior officers. They are learning to make decisions in chaotic conditions and to be mentally agile in executing counterinsurgency and nation-building operations simultaneously. As a result, the Army will soon have a cohort of company grade officers who are accustomed to operating independently, taking the initiative, and adapting to changes. The author warns that the Army must now acknowledge and encourage this newly developed adaptability in our junior officers or risk stifling the innovation critically needed in the Army's future leaders.

◆ **IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT [NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY] SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.**

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). September 1, 2004.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/gov-2004-60.pdf>

[pdf format, 24 pages]

According to this IAEA report, two issues remain key to understanding the extent and nature of Iran's enrichment program. The first issue relates to the origin of uranium contamination found at various locations in Iran. IAEA has made some progress towards ascertaining the source of the high enriched uranium (HEU) contamination found at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and Natanz. From the Agency's analysis to date, it appears plausible that the HEU contamination found at those locations may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop or at Natanz. However, the Agency will continue to pursue the identification of sources and reasons for such contamination. IAEA will also continue with its efforts to understand the source of the low enriched uranium (LEU) contamination found in various locations in Iran, including on domestically manufactured components.

The second issue relates to the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 design. While the Agency has gained a better understanding of Iran's efforts relevant to both designs, additional work by IAEA will be necessary to confirm Iran's statements regarding the absence of P-2 centrifuge related activities in Iran between 1995 and 2002 and regarding P-2 centrifuge procurement related activities.

Other issues that will also require further follow-up, for example the timeframe of Iran's plutonium separation experiments.

◆ **IRAN: TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH**

by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs; Suzanne Maloney, Project Director;

Council on Foreign Relations, July 2004, 84 p.

<http://www.cfr.org/>

→ Publications → Reports or:

http://www.cfr.org/pub7194/zbigniew_brzezinski_robert_m_gates_suzanne_maloney/iran_time_for_a_new_approach.php

The lack of sustained engagement with Iran harms American interests, and direct dialogue with Tehran on specific areas of mutual concern should be pursued, concludes a Council-sponsored Independent Task Force, Iran: Time for a New Approach.

◆ **IRAQ INDEX: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq.**

Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

<http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>

The Iraq Index is a statistical compilation of economic and security data. This resource will provide updated information on various criteria, including crime, telephone and water service, troop fatalities, unemployment, Iraqi security forces, oil production, and coalition troop strength.

The index is designed to quantify the rebuilding efforts and offer an objective set of criteria for benchmarking performance. It is the first in-depth, non-partisan assessment of American efforts in Iraq, and is based primarily on U.S. government information. Although measurements of progress in any nation-building effort can never be reduced to purely quantitative data, a comprehensive compilation of such information can provide a clearer picture and contribute to a healthier and better informed debate.

Updated every Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

◆ **RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ. [Middle East Report No. 30]**

International Crisis Group (ICG). September 2, 2004.

http://www.icg.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/iraq_iraq_iran_gulf/30_reconstructing_iraq.pdf

[pdf format, 39 pages]

This report examines the steps taken in reconstructing post-Saddam Iraq to date, and suggests elements of a new approach. The need is immediate and great, says the report, because at stake is the very stability of the country. As long as living conditions fail to improve, nascent Iraqi institutions will continue to lose credibility, and the insurgency will continue to gain momentum. Iraq desperately needs a genuine economic recovery strategy if it is to escape its vicious circle of hardship, discontent and violence. Assessments of how this vicious circle emerged must clearly recognize the difficulties of rebuilding an economy ravaged by Baathist misrule, war, and sanctions, but the performance of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) itself fell far short of Iraqi needs and has left a fragile, dysfunctional legacy on which to build.

According to the report's authors, the Interim Government must devise ways to bring about immediate material improvement and set the stage for longer-term rebuilding. This means protecting and creating jobs; decentralization and far greater Iraqi involvement at both national and local levels; and structural steps to curtail corruption, including that which develops when positions are distributed along ethnic/sectarian lines.

Missile Defense

◆ **BRITAIN'S ROLE IN U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE**

Dr. Jeremy Stocker

U.S. ARMY WAR College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004, 44 p.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/pubyear.cfm?year=2004>

America's European allies, especially Britain, have frequently been concerned by the wider implications of U.S. repeated efforts to develop and deploy missile defense. The United Kingdom

is host to one of three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Stations (BMEWS) and to the European ground station for the Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS), both vital elements in U.S. missile defense architecture. Britain also has a long record of technological cooperation in missile defense. Britons do not share American concerns about North Korea, and are not prepared to view China as a long-term strategic competitor requiring a BMD response. The UK is progressively shedding many of its previous concerns about the wider consequences of missile defense deployment and gaining a better appreciation of the advantages of collaboration in both the policy and technical fields. For America's part, an understanding of the UK's stance and a willingness to engage in honest and forthright consultation are essential if the United States is to maximize the advantages of international cooperation in missile defense and avoid some of its penalties. Despite a recent focus on events in Iraq, missile defense remains a vital issue in U.S.-British relations and a subject of considerable intrinsic importance. Both countries need to better understand each other's policies and concerns, and cooperate in providing effective and appropriate defense capabilities.

◆ **CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE. [RS21921]**

Ravi R. Hichkad and Christopher Bolkcom.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated August 27, 2004.

<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21921.pdf>

[pdf format, 6 pages]

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1996 called on the Department of Defense (DOD) to embark upon an initiative to develop cruise missile defense (CMD) programs emphasizing operational efficiency and affordability. Advanced cruise missiles (CMs) — those designed with stealthy capabilities to evade detection — were noted as a prominent threat prompting the need for effective CMD. This CMD initiative was to be well coordinated with other air defense efforts; that is, with “cruise missile defense programs ... and ballistic missile defense programs ... mutually supporting” each other. Three years later, in conjunction with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1999, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted: “[T]he committee does not believe that the Department of Defense has adequately integrated its various cruise missile defense programs into a coherent architecture and development plan.”

CMD today is primarily an issue of force protection for U.S. troops deployed in a theater of conflict. The CM threat to the United States appears lower than the theater CM threat, but it also seems likely to grow. Given ongoing proliferation challenges, there is general consensus that CM technology will continue to spread. Many claim that the United States' dominance of manned military aviation will drive many countries to adopt CMs as the “poor man's air force.” By 2015, the CIA estimates that up to two dozen nations will be able to pose a serious CM threat — primarily in theater but also through forward-deployed weapons platforms. Also, the U.S. failure to detect several Iraqi CMs launched against American assets during Operation Iraqi Freedom has led some in DOD to now deem CMD a “critical mission area.”

◆ **DEPLOYING MISSILE DEFENSE: MAJOR OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES.**

[Strategic Forum No. 209]

M. Elaine Bunn.

National Defense University (NDU). Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). August 2004

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF209/SF209.pdf>

[pdf format, 6 pages]

By October 2004, the United States will have begun initial deployment of a missile defense capability—albeit a modest, limited, and not completely proven one—to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack. The gradual phase-in of ballistic missile defense deployments will mark an important change in the policy context of the missile defense issue. Past debate focused on whether missile defenses should be deployed and whether they would work. These issues will now share the limelight with another pressing question: how would missile defenses actually be used?

The author examines seven challenges of operating a missile defense system: 1) to whom weapons release authority should be delegated; 2) how limited missile defense assets should be allocated; 3) what roles the President and Secretary of Defense should play during intercept operations; 4) how strike options should be coordinated with defenses; 5) which U.S. command should be responsible for conducting missile defense operations; 6) how testing and operational requirements should best be balanced; 7) what arrangements are needed to notify Russia when the United States launches missile defense interceptors, to reduce possible miscalculation by Moscow.

Bunn argues that in order to manage the transition to defense, policy guidance to address these challenges will have to be somewhat flexible; it will likely evolve over time, based on the evolution of the system as well as operational experience and future testing using varied assumptions and scenarios.

NATO

◆ NATO TRANSFORMED.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). July 2004.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/nato-trans-eng.pdf>

[English-language, pdf format, 48 pages]

<http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/nato-trans-fre.pdf>

[French-language, pdf format, 48 pages]

This glossy document provides a comprehensive introduction describing how NATO works and reviewing policy developments throughout its history. When the Alliance was founded in 1949, the Soviet Union was seen as the main threat to the freedom and independence of Western Europe. Communist ideology, political aims and methods and military capacity meant that, whatever the Soviet Union's real intentions may have been, no Western government could afford to ignore the possibility of conflict. As a result, from 1949 to the end of the 1980s – the period known as the Cold War – the Alliance's main task was to maintain sufficient military capabilities to defend its members against any form of aggression by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The stability provided by NATO during this period helped Western Europe as a whole to rebuild its prosperity after the Second World War, creating the confidence and predictability that are essential for economic growth.

NATO's transformation during the past decade has been characterized by a series of initiatives that represent concrete, highly practical responses to the new security challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War environment. These include the Partnership for Peace, special relations with Russia and Ukraine, a dialogue with Mediterranean countries, the Membership Action Plan to help aspiring countries meet NATO standards, and effective cooperation with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) and the United Nations. NATO is also actively addressing evolving security challenges by leading crisis-management operations in the Balkans and committing itself to operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism and other new threats beyond the Euro- Atlantic area.

Terrorism

◆ HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (HEMP) AND HIGH POWER MICROWAVE (HPM) DEVICES: THREAT ASSESSMENTS. [RL32544]

Clay Wilson.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. August 20, 2004.

<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32544.pdf>

[pdf format, 17 pages]

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is an intense energy field that can instantly overload or disrupt numerous electrical circuits at a distance. Modern high technology microcircuits are especially sensitive to power surges, and the possible vulnerability of U.S. civilian computer systems to the effects of EMP has been discussed in the media. EMP can be produced on a large scale using a single nuclear explosion, and on a smaller, non-nuclear scale using a device with batteries or chemical explosives. Several nations, including reported sponsors of terrorism, may currently have a capability to use EMP as a weapon for cyber warfare or cyber terrorism, to disrupt computers, communications systems, or parts of the U.S. critical infrastructure.

The threat of an attack against the United States involving EMP is hard to assess, but some observers indicate that it is growing along with worldwide access to newer technologies and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the past, the threat of mutually assured destruction provided a lasting deterrent against the exchange of multiple high-yield nuclear warheads. However, now a single, specially-designed low-yield nuclear explosion high above the United States, or over a battlefield, can produce an EMP effect that results in a widespread loss of electronics, but no direct fatalities, and may not necessarily evoke a large nuclear retaliatory strike by the U.S. military. This, coupled with the possible vulnerability of U.S. commercial electronics and U.S. military battlefield equipment to the effects of EMP, may create a new incentive for other countries to develop or acquire a nuclear capability.

Policy issues raised by this threat include (1) what is the United States doing to protect civilian critical infrastructure systems against the threat of EMP, (2) does the level of vulnerability of U.S. civilian and military electronics to large-scale EMP attack encourage other nations to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and (3) how likely are terrorist organizations to launch a smaller-scale EMP attack against the United States?

◆ THE MULTI-STATE ANTI-TERRORISM INFORMATION EXCHANGE (MATRIX) PILOT PROJECT. [RL32536]

William J. Krouse.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. August 18, 2004.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32536.pdf>

[pdf format, 13 pages]

This report provides an overview of the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) pilot project, which leverages advanced computer/information management capabilities to more quickly access, share, and analyze public records to help law enforcement generate leads, expedite investigations, and possibly prevent terrorist attacks. The pilot project is intended to demonstrate the effective use of such capabilities, but it is less clear whether the project has been designed to prevent unnecessary intrusions on privacy.

The MATRIX pilot project is being administered by the Institute for Intergovernmental Research for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Project security and access to the MATRIX system is managed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The project is being funded by the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness (\$8 million) and the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance (\$4 million).

Privacy advocates, civil libertarians, and others oppose MATRIX and similar systems for fear that unrestricted data mining could lead to a massive invasion of privacy, as such systems could enable governments to scrutinize the lives and activities of ordinary citizens. Advocates for the MATRIX pilot project counter that this system allows authorized investigators to share and analyze information that is already available to law enforcement from public and state-owned data, without a subpoena or court order. They contend that, with MATRIX, limited investigative information can be developed to generate potential leads within seconds, as opposed to taking days or weeks to manually track and acquire the same information.

◆ **TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA. [RL32259]**

K. Alan Kronstadt and Bruce Vaughn.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Updated August 9, 2004.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35167.pdf>

[pdf format, 30 pages]

This report reviews the terrorist environment in South Asia, concentrating on Pakistan and India, but also including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The existence of international terrorist groups and their supporters in South Asia is identified as a threat to both regional stability and to the attainment of central U.S. policy goals. Al Qaeda forces that fled from Afghanistan with their Taliban supporters remain

active on Pakistani territory, and Al Qaeda is believed to have links with indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups that have conducted anti-Western attacks and that support separatist militancy in Indian Kashmir. A significant portion of Pakistan's ethnic Pashtun population is reported to sympathize with the Taliban and even Al Qaeda. The United States maintains close counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan aimed especially at bolstering security and stability in neighboring Afghanistan. In the latter half of 2003, the Islamabad government began limited military operations in the traditionally autonomous tribal areas of western Pakistan. Such operations intensified in 2004 in coordination with U.S. and Afghan forces just across the international frontier. After a long period during which few notable arrests were made in Pakistan, security officers there appear in the summer of 2004 to have made major strides in breaking up significant Al Qaeda and related networks operating in Pakistani cities.

The 9/11 Commission Report released in July 2004 contains recommendations for U.S. policy toward Pakistan. The report emphasizes the importance of prioritizing the elimination of terrorist sanctuaries in western Pakistan and near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and calls for the

provision of long-term and comprehensive support to the government of President Musharraf so long as that government remains committed to combating terrorism and to a policy of “enlightened moderation.”

The United States remains concerned by the continued “cross-border infiltration” of Islamic militants who traverse the Kashmiri Line of Control to engage in terrorist acts in India and Indian Kashmir.

India also is home to several indigenous separatist and Maoist-oriented terrorist groups. Moreover, it is thought that some Al Qaeda elements fled to Bangladesh. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka have been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under U.S. law, while Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/ United Peoples Front, have been listed as “other terrorist groups” by the State Department. This report will be updated periodically.

◆ THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM: INITIAL FINDINGS.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). August 31, 2004.

http://www.csis.org/isp/0408_transatlanticterrorism.pdf

[pdf format, 20 pages]

This report includes the observations of government officials, scholars and policy experts from both sides of the Atlantic, who gathered for a series of meetings over a 10-month period to discuss improving the EU-U.S. counter-terrorism partnership.

The report asserts that Europe and the United States differ little in assessing the severity of the international terrorist threat and agree that jihadist terrorist groups are seeking weapons of mass destruction. They also concur that there is a very limited understanding of the origins of the jihadist movement and of the ideological dynamics that sustain it. For coordination of counterterrorism efforts to be effective, the report suggests that EU and U.S. officials address several specific avenues: Poverty and Development Assistance; Demography; Education; Soft vs. Hard Power Instruments

Warfare

◆ CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE. [Conference Papers]

United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). National Intelligence Council (NIC). May 2004.

http://www.odci.gov/nic/NIC_2020_2004_05_25_intro.html

In May 2004 the National Intelligence Council (NIC) convened many of the world’s top experts on warfare to discuss key topics and questions focused on: Surveying the prospects for conflict around the world between today and 2020; What are the contemporary characteristics of war that are likely to persist into the future?; How can we tell, are there signposts?; What are the characteristics of contemporary conflict that are likely to be consigned to the dustbin of history by 2020?; What are the emerging characteristics of war?

The following papers were presented at the conference; each is available at the url provided below in both pdf and Microsoft Word format.

How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?

Does the U.S. Face a Future of Never-ending Subnational & Transnational Violence?

Global Evolutions and the Role of Nuclear Weapons: Alternative Futures for the Next Decade
Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview
European Perspectives on Security - Lessons of the Conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa
Lessons of Post-Cold War Conflict: Middle Eastern Lessons and Perspectives
Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and Continuity
The Evolution of Conflict Through 2020: Demands on Personnel, Machines, and Missions
The Chinese People's Liberation Army in 2020
Caught in the Crossfire: Australian and Asia-Pacific Responses to the Changing Nature of War
The American Way of War through 2020
Fighting on the Edges: The Nature of War in 2020
Possibilities of War: The Confluence of Persistent Contemporary Flashpoints and Worrisome New Trouble Spots
Virtuous Destruction, Decisive Speed
The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Middle East: If this is a Revolution, then we are the Counterrevolutionists
Potential Conflict in Latin America
Transforming Transformation—Will it Change the Character of War?
Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future
Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020?

WMD

◆ JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

[JP 3-40]

United States Department of Defense (DOD). Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). July 8, 2004.

Full Report:

http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf

[pdf format, 81 pages]

Table of Contents:

<http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/browsePubs/tblContents.jsp?d=3&pubId=112&pubNum=null&bol=1&searchType=0&pubOne=0>

[sections in html format, various pagings]

Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is one of the greatest challenges the United States faces. The proliferation of WMD is a global problem that routinely crosses combatant commands' geographical boundaries. The challenge of combating WMD necessitates an integrated and dynamic approach that leverages activities of three pillars:

1) nonproliferation (NP); 2) counterproliferation (CP) and; 3) weapons of mass destruction consequence management (WMD CM). The increasing availability of highly destructive technology combined with a variety of weapons and means of delivery from both non-state and state actors greatly exacerbates the problem. WMD in the possession of non-state actors could potentially kill large numbers of people without warning. The nexus between non-state actors and WMD constitutes one of Department of Defense's top priorities.

This publication sets forth the principles to plan for and conduct operations for combating WMD and their means of delivery. It addresses joint military actions to eliminate the threat of WMD and their means of delivery to the United States, its forces and its allies. It provides guidance on joint and multinational operations and interagency coordination.

Miscellaneous

◆ CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES. AN IASC REFERENCE PAPER.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). June 28, 2004.

<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/ocha-civmil-28jun.pdf>

[pdf format, 17 pages]

This report was endorsed by the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) at its 57th Meeting, June 16-17, 2004.

In the last two years alone, military support and/or protection for certain humanitarian operations has been provided in various complex emergencies, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Northern Uganda, and Sierra Leone. This paper will serve as a non-binding reference for humanitarian practitioners, assisting them in formulating country-specific operational guidelines on civil-military relations for particular complex emergencies. Part 1 of the document reviews in a generic manner the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Part 2 lists the fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military, and Part 3 proposes practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

◆ [FBI] STRATEGIC PLAN, 2004-2009.

United States Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). August 9, 2004.

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf>

[pdf format, 132 pages]

Among the FBI forecasts in this report are: Sub-national and non-governmental entities will play an increasing role in world affairs for years to come, presenting new "asymmetric" threats to the United States; The United States will continue to occupy a position of economic and political leadership — and although other governments will also continue to be important actors on the world stage — terrorist groups, criminal enterprises, and other non-state actors will assume an increasing role in international affairs; Nation states and their governments will exercise decreasing control over the flow of information, resources, technology, services, and people; Globalization and the trend of an increasingly networked world economy will become more pronounced within the next five years; The global economy will stabilize some regions, but widening economic divides are likely to make areas, groups, and nations that are left behind

breeding grounds for unrest, violence, and terrorism. The FBI also posits that as corporate, financial, and nationality definitions and structures become more complex and global, the distinction between foreign and domestic entities will increasingly blur. This will lead to further globalization and networking of criminal elements, directly threatening the security of the United States.

In his introduction to the strategic plan, FBI Director Robert Mueller says that the “FBI’s greatest challenges will be to further improve its intelligence capabilities and strengthen its information technology infrastructure. The FBI will continue to develop its talents through ongoing training, and through the recruitment and hiring of analysts, technology experts, and individuals with language skills. The FBI’s international presence will continue to grow . . .”.

◆ **FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES NOW DRIVEN BY 9/11 AND IRAQ. [Eroding Respect for America Seen as Major Problem.]**

Council on Foreign Relations; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Web-posted August 18, 2004.

<http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/222.pdf>

[pdf format, 78 pages]

or: <http://www.cfr.org/pdf/CFRPEW.pdf>

[pdf format, 79 pages]

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, in association with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), conducted a survey of foreign policy attitudes 2,009 adults in the United States. The survey finds a 59% majority faulting the Bush administration for being too quick to use force rather than trying hard enough to reach diplomatic solutions. But while the public has deep reservations about the war in Iraq, there is sustained support for the doctrine of preemption. A 60% majority believes that the use of military force can at least be sometimes justified against countries that may seriously threaten the U.S. but have not attacked.

Among other central findings of the survey are the following partisan differences with regard to foreign policy:

Fully 80% of Democrats and 74% of independents say the United States is less respected by other countries than in the past. Only about half of Republicans (47%) believe the U.S. has lost respect.

Democrats rate protecting the jobs of American workers and combating terrorism as about equal in importance, and at the top of their scale of foreign policy priorities. For Republicans, by comparison, combating terrorism is by far the single most important policy objective.

◆ **JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID). [JP 3-07.1]**

United States Department of Defense (DOD). Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). April 30, 2004.

Full Report:

http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_07_1.pdf

[pdf format, 167 pages]

Table of Contents:

<http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/browsePubs/tblContents.jsp?d=3&pubId=110&pubNum=null&bol=1&searchType=0&pubOne=0>

[sections in html format, various pagings]

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The focus of all U.S. foreign internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) program of internal defense and development (IDAD). These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by emphasizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principal focus of U.S. efforts. The United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. Military assistance is often necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the above efforts to become effective.

This publication establishes joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting FID operations. It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host nation efforts to combat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It updates guidance provided in a 1996 publication.

◆ U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: STATE DEPARTMENT AND BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS EXPAND POST-9/11 EFFORTS BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN. TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM. [GAO-04-1061T]

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). August 23, 2004.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041061t.pdf>

[pdf format, 21 pages]

Although the Department of State (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, GAO has found no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and other federal agencies' communication efforts. The absence of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages to overseas audiences. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States do a better job defining its public diplomacy message, but GAO found that State does not have a strategy that integrates and aligns all its diverse public diplomacy activities. State, noting the need to fix the problem, recently established a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. The BBG did have a strategic plan, but the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan.

GAO also found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. The BBG subsequently made audience size a key performance goal and added broadcaster credibility and plans to add other performance measures that GAO recommended. In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. State officials are trying to address staffing gaps through increased recruitment. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational,

and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. It has developed a number of solutions to address these challenges, according to this testimony.

Centre de Ressources et d'Information

2, rue Saint Florentin

75382 PARIS CEDEX 08

<http://www.amb-usa.fr/irc/home.htm>